Coalitions and counter-coalitions in online contestation: an analysis of the German and

British climate change debate
Mobilization goes along with counter-mobilization, ideas trigger counter-ideas and coalitions struggle with counter-coalitions. Political contestation is -at least -a two-sided process.
However, the strength of the competing camps in pushing forward their agenda varies along an axis of different conflict configurations. At one extreme, the political contest is defined by opposing camps with equal potential to influence public opinion, mass media and the institutional process. At the other extreme, political conflict is characterized by a dominant coalition and their master frame, while counter-voices are hardly visible and lack institutional access. Such a situation is labelled a 'policy monopoly' (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993: 6f.) .
Traditionally, political contestation has been shaped by national elites. Policy studies have primarily focused on political elites and their impact on policy formulation whereas studies on mass media have revealed that media follow the constellation among the political elite: they tend to neglect issues not raised by national political elites (Author) and hardly articulate dissenting positions if there is a consensus among the elite (Bennett, 1990) . If social movements and other 'challengers' (Kriesi, 2004) have come into focus of research, they have been shown to face difficulties entering the political process as well as traditional media (Bennett, 1990; Wolfsfeld, 1997) .
Today, however, the Internet opens up a new venue for political contestation that has been associated with hopes for a 'democratic reconfiguration and redistribution of traditional sources of news and information on a global scale' (Kellner and Pierce, 2008: 393) . This reconfiguration is based on the idea that the Internet with its low access barriers breaks the monopoly of traditional media to decide what is relevant for a society and opens up new possibilities for non-elite actors to raise their voices (Benkler, 2006) . In such a 'hybrid media system' (Chadwick, 2013 ) the different channels of communication are intertwined and civil society ac-tivists and public officials try to promote their positions and frames both through traditional media as well as through all types of online media. As a wide variety of different actor types are connected in such a networked public sphere, ideas from outside the political elite may have a chance to diffuse more easily (e.g. Benkler et al. 2013 ). However, recently, it has been noted that this shift of power in public contestation away from traditional media and political elites may also spur anti-democratic, anti-liberal as well as post-factual voices (e.g. Benkler et al., 2017) .
In our study we seek to understand the role of the Internet in settings characterized by policy monopolies. Policy monopolies consist of a dominant coalition of elite (and non-elite) actors that is able to define the agenda, whereas the counter-coalition is weak and invisible. As the Internet expands the public sphere, does it allow counter-coalitions to successfully challenge the status of dominant policy constellations or does it reflect traditional power constellations?
To answer this question, we seek to (1) identify coalitions and counter-coalitions on the Web and to analyse (2) how these coalitions differ resource-wise and where these differences come from. To do so, we rely on a unique dataset on actor relationships in hyperlink networks, as well as on the content discussed within these networks, which helps us describe the political position, type and geographical location of the actors. We compare such networks originating from German and British civil society actors over the course of 11 months in the field of climate change -two countries in which those warning of the negative consequences of man-made climate change hold a policy monopoly.
The contributions of this study are two-fold: First, instead of studying mobilization and contestation among a specific actor type (e.g. for blogs Adamic and Glance, 2005; Elgesem et al., 2015; e.g. political elites Park et al., 2004; Shumate, 2012; e.g. for NGOs Simpson, 2015) we adopt a link-tracing approach that incorporates a variety of these actors. Such an approach allows us to analyze how elite and non-elite actors mobilize together or against each other and how national and transnational dimensions are intertwined (see also Elgin, 2015) . Second, our study contributes theoretically and empirically to defining coalitions on the Web and to measuring their resources taking the two-or multi-sided nature of political contestation into account. We thereby follow an approach that starts out from actors' political positions asking whether they are underpinned by linking behavior instead of relying on community detection algorithms that take hyperlinks as their starting point (e.g Elgesem et al., 2015) .
Online (Counter-) Coalitions
In recent times, coalitions have been analysed online. Benkler et al. (2013) for example study the emergence of a coalition against the online piracy act in the US and Bennett and Segeberg (2013) also interpret movement networks as coalitions. In this vein, also Pilny and Shumate (2012) show that NGO hyperlinks are used to collective identity formation reflecting offline alliances among the involved actors (also Simpson, 2015) . All of these studies, however, analyse online coalitions without taking the opponent side of contestation into account. Consequently, while these studies are able to shed light on the mobilization processes of social movement organizations, their one-sided focus fails to reveal the more complex dynamics generated by the interplay of proponents and opponents. These configurations have only recently been given attention. Based on community detection algorithms, Elgesem et al. (2015) for example show that climate change skeptical and advocate communities exist in the blogosphere. Yet, such an approach -if used for coalition identification -is based on the premise that links reveal coalitions. As links may have different meanings (for summaries De Maeyer, 2012; Pilny and Shumate, 2012), Elgesem et al. (2015) question in how far the identified communities fully present communities in a social sense. Building on but also departing from these studies, we start out from a theoretical notion of coalitions that describes them in a social sense demarcating them based on their ideological core that is then underpinned by their connective fabric. To do so, we draw on Sabatier's advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier, 1988; Sabatier and Weible, 2007) as it offers a definition of coalitions that can well be adapted to online settings (see also Elgin, 2015) and is fully interpretable in a social sense.
Following this framework, a coalition is formed (1) in response to concrete policy issues and
(2) comprises different types of actors such as political actors, lobbyists and administrative agencies, but also journalists, scientific representatives, non-profit organizations and private consultants. It is constituted by a shared belief system (3) which is characterized by core (policy) beliefs defining the general direction in which a coalition seeks to push policy programs.
Coalition allies agree on such core beliefs (which are very hard to change) whereas variation occurs as regards the secondary strategic aspects, i.e. the instrumental decisions and framings surrounding these core beliefs. The ideological core of such coalitions is underpinned by (4) a non-trivial degree of internal coordination and by (5) some stability over time. i This approach is well suited to study coalitions in online contestation as web researchers also apply an issue-specific logic (1) to draw boundaries for the investigation of the potentially endless web (e.g. Ackland and O'Neil, 2011; Rogers and Marres, 2000) and as online contestation is shaped by a multitude of actors (e.g. bloggers, NOGs, politicians or media)
(2). Beyond, core beliefs (3) are clearly formulated by actors on the web (e.g. Elgin, 2015) and become visible in the documents published. In addition, hyperlinks being part of the connective fabric of the web (Gerlitz and Helmond, 2013) indicate public expressions of affiliations (Fu and Shumate, 2016) or citation links (Adamic and Glance, 2005) and as such might be useful to analyse coalitions' coordination (4). Although there is evidence that such hyperlinks carry many meanings in different settings, researchers have shown that they are especially frequent among like-minded actors. It is actors with similar political positions, who stem from the same party, work on similar issue or come from the same geographical area that are more closely connected (e.g. Ackland and O'Neil, 2011; Adamic and Glance, 2005; Gonzalez-Bailón, 2009; Himelboim et al., 2013; Kim et al., 2010; Park et al., 2004; Tremayne et al., 2006) . As a consequence, coalition allies should also be more closely connected to each other than to the opponent side. As links thereby partially decide on the attention allocation on the web, this form of internal coordination makes sure that the link economy plays in favour of the own camp (Fisher et al., 2013) . Finally, it is an open question (as longitudinal studies of the web are rare) whether online contestation has a stable core (5) -a last criterion for coalitions.
A Coalition's Resources and their Origin
Coalitions differ in their access to different resources such as financial means, important allies and their degree of support which influence their ability to push forward their core ideas (Sabatier and Weible, 2007) . We focus on two resources: a traditional one stemming from the composition of allies and an online-specific resource, namely online visibility. A coalition is regarded resourceful if it involves allies from the classical venues, i.e. media and political actors into the coalition structure and if these allies are rooted on the national level.
Such actors have the capacity to push and accelerate the issue (Benkler et al., 2013) . As most studies concerned with online coalitions or networks analyse only one type of actor our knowledge on the composition of (counter-) coalitions is sparse.
A second important resource of a coalition is its online visibility which allows 'to include and exclude issues, frames and contributors' (Bennett and Segerberg, 2014: 424) . Online visibility is shaped by various forms of web connectivity (Gerlitz and Helmond, 2013) . Hyperlinksthe focus of this study -are one of the first, yet still important mechanisms shaping this connective fabric of the web which today, however, have been complemented by more participatory connective fabrics originating in the recommendation systems of social media (Gerlitz and Helmond, 2013) . Hyperlinks play a dual role in shaping online visibility: they decide the pathways a surfer can follow and shape the algorithmic selection (Gonzalez-Bailón, 2009). Search algorithms are based on the idea that sites receiving many links are more important than those that gather only few of them. Moreover, if these links then stem from highly visible actors, the importance is further increased (Brin and Page, 1998) .
Following this line of reasoning, links influence on the web 'who gets the pole position' (Gonzalez-Bailón, 2009: 271) or as Ackland and O'Neil (2011) put it who receives authority.
It has to be noted, that this attention economy is independent of the evaluation a link contains.
Thus, also critique links foster visibility. As visibility is even more important in the multichannel information environment online compared to traditional mass media (for which researchers claim that even negative visibility fosters success (e.g. Ellinas, 2010)), we regard the receiving of links as an important resource of a coalition.
Studies that focus on the overall hyperlink structure of the web have revealed that visibility online is unequally distributed. They have shown that few very popular actors receive most links whereas the bulk of actors within the networks are marginal (Barabási, 2003; Gonzalez-Bailón, 2009; Hindman, 2009; Kim et al., 2010) . These hierarchical structures resemble scale-free power-law distributions and are the result of linking behaviour that preferences sites that are already well connected (preferential attachment, see Barabási and Albert, 1999) .
As an often overlooked consequence, hyperlinks are just as concentrated as traditional media (Hindman, 2009) and in the end only few actors are able to profit, in terms of visibility, from the advantages of online communication.
Thereby, research points out that it is not necessarily the elites that turn most visible online (yet, for evidence of online elite dominance, see e.g. Gerhards and Schäfer, 2009; Gonzalez-Bailon, 2009 ), but it may well be those challenging a societal master frame (we will refer to them as counter-movements here). Benkler et al. (2013) for example illustrate how a countermovement online wins against one of the best-funded lobby organizations in the US in the case of online piracy regulations whereas Bennett and Segerberg (2013) analyse how movements like the Occupy or Indignados profit from online communication. Kaiser et al. (2017) show that the far-right in the US managed to influence the more traditional conservative media via Breitbart during the US election campaign 2016. The significance of the Internet for counter-movements, however, has not only been shown for established democracies, but also for countries which experience more governmental control. Looking at China, for example, Peng has shown that online discourse has contributed to trigger governmental actions (Peng, 2005) whereas Zhou and Moy's study (Zhou and Moy, 2007) indicates that online communication helps pushing neglected issues on the traditional media agenda. Further on, it is revolutionary periods (like the Arab spring), in which online communication has contributed to sustain and accelerate the countermovement's protests (e.g. Wolfsfeld et al., 2013) .
Based on such studies, authors have formulated their hope that the online world leads to a democratic power reconfiguration (Bentivegna, 2002; Kellner and Pierce, 2008) : 'The networked public sphere is an alternative arena for public discourse and political debate, an arena that is less dominated by large media entities, less subject to government control, and more open to wider participation.' (Benkler et al., 2013: 5) . More recently, however, researchers and politicians have started to realize that also counter-voices which oppose basic democratic values (see for the concept of bad civil society Chambers and Kopstein, 2001: 839) and / or replace factual through post-factual information (see e.g. House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2012; Silber and Bhatt, 2007) exploit the possibilities of the Web.
The most prominent example, in this vein, is probably the Islamic State which some even claim would never have 'come into existence, let alone been able to survive and expand' without digital technologies (e.g. Atwan, 2015: 9 ). Yet also within the Western world such counter-voices have gained ground: the alt-right sphere in the US (Benkler et al., 2017) , the climate skeptics (e.g. Schäfer, 2012; Elgesem 2017) or the anti-vaccination movement (e.g. Guidry et al. 2015; Basch et al., 2017) might serve as prominent examples.
Although we know that online visibility is unequally distributed and that under specific circumstances even challengers may become visible, we lack a full understanding as regards the origins of such visibility. Visibility derives from acts of strategic hyperlinking (Young & Leonardi, 2012) which takes over a gatekeeping function in structuring the web (Dimitrova et al., 2003) . When deciding on whom to link to, like-minded and trusted actors are privileged (Author, Park & Thelwall, 2003; Elgesem, 2017) whereas links to those whom one seeks to "exclude […] from the discourse due to differences in the way they conceptualize the underlying causes and the particular solution to the problem" are avoided (Young & Leonardi, 2012: 236, see also Rogers & Marres, 2000) . However, with its focus on the direction of link setting, this research only partially reveals the origins of visibility as it largely ignores the quantitative differences in the link setting activity of proponents and
opponents. An exception is Kaiser's (2017) study on the commenting activity of different camps that shows that those challenging the mainstream are more actively engaged.
Similarly, Ackland and O'Neil (2011) show that splits within the environmental movement lead to differences in subgroup visibility, what they refer to as "index authority", which refers to the fact that central actors in hyperlink networks will be ranked higher in search engine indexes. Jackson and Foucault Welles (2015) in turn use the concept of "crowdsourced elites" to refer to the fact that the features and affordances of online communication allow dissenters to organically create central actors in networks of political disputes -activist organizations, independent media and individual citizens -who surpass traditional elites in terms of visibility.
Case Selection and Methods
Case Selection
To study online contestation among competing coalitions, we analyze the issue of climate change in Germany and the United Kingdom from June 2012 to May 2013. As an issue, climate change presents clear-cut political divisions, which result in two core policy beliefs.
Such beliefs separate those who see the anthropogenic contribution to global warming as a problem -climate advocates -and thus follow the scientific consensus formulated by the IPCC (IPCC, 2013) from those who, to varying degrees, dispute the extent to which humanrelated activities affect the climate and/or the seriousness of its consequences -the climate skeptics. We have chosen these two countries in the specific time period of 2012 /13 as here climate advocates (still) hold a policy monopoly in traditional venues, dominating climate politics, parliamentary debates, traditional media as well as public opinion (although climate skeptics have gained some visibility, e.g. Brunnengräber, 2013 , Painter & Gavin, 2016 , Carter & Clements, 2015 . In climate politics, both countries had been at the international forefront of cutting greenhouse gas emissions and energy use, while working on effective climate policies as well as the introduction of renewable energies (German Watch, 2013) . The dominance of the advocates' camp is also reflected in parliamentary debates during this time period where only few skeptical frames become visible (Author). In 2012 /13, climate advocates also dominated the traditional media. AUTHOR for example shows that around 75% of all articles about climate change in the UK and around 70% in the German press do not contain any skeptical arguments. Finally, a closed-up view on public opinion indicates that a large majority in both countries follows the climate advocates: 83% in the UK and 90% in Germany agree that climate change is a fairly or very serious problem (European Commission, 2011). In sum, the comparative research design chosen nicely reflects policy monopo-lies on climate change in both countries -an ideal setting to study the role of the Internet for counter-coalitions.
Collecting data: applying link tracing and content analysis
To identify the involved coalitions and to describe coalitions' resources and their origin, we rely on link tracing and content analysis applying a five-step procedure. First, our link tracing approach starts from the eight most important civil society actors in the field of climate change in each country -four of them are climate advocates and four climate skeptics. ii Following Kriesi (2004) civil society actors pursue specific political goals, yet lack institutionalized access to the political process. They have been chosen as starting points as they link to a variety of actors (Rogers and Marres, 2000) , as they are the 'champions of online communication' (Schäfer, 2012: 530) and they are the ones most likely challenging the policy monopolies. To identify which civil society actors serve as source seeds, we relied on a literature review and combined it with expert interviews and country-specific Google searches on climate change and global warming (with deleted search histories). Selecting equal numbers of advocates and skeptics in each country we aim for capturing the full ontology of online contestation giving both sides equal starting positions.
Second, we make use of a web-crawling software, called the IssueCrawler (Rogers, 2010) .
For each country, this crawler starts from the eight selected source seeds and collects all hyperlinks that point to other websites for which the crawler then -in a second step -checks for links running between them. We have chosen a snowball procedure because it allows us to identify cross-camp linking. Beyond, we have limited the crawler setting to follow only one step out as pre-studies have revealed that further steps out primarily find irrelevant pages, i.e. pages that do not deal with climate change. As web-crawlers are blind to the fact whether the included pages actually deal with the issue under consideration, we have indexed all crawled pages in a third step according to our keywords. iii Only those pages that contain our keywords remain in the network.
To allow for a better analysis of the networks, we have added a fourth step of data preparation. As we are interested in actors as the nodes of our networks and not in networks connecting single web pages, we have aggregated an actor's single web pages and sub-domains. Beyond, we have deleted the most marginal actors requiring that an actor within the network contains at minimum two links -one of them must be an inlink meaning that an actor is recognized at least by one other actor within the network. In addition, we have dichotomized the networks so that per crawl only one link at maximum runs between a pair of actors. This is necessary as the number of links is very much dependent on the construction of the webpages itself. Additionally, for blogs we have deleted all links stemming from the blogroll thus only focusing on links within the use text. Finally, we have stacked the resulting networks that were collected once per month in an eleven-month period. By stacking the networks, we see how often a specific actor appears in the network (between one and 11 times). The stacked networks serve as the basis for the analyses and contain 361 unique actors in Germany with 3667 links and 353 unique actors in the UK containing 6609 links. iv Fifth, we have analyzed all actors within the network with a quantitative content analysis. For the coding we used the information found on the 'About us' pages or similar sections of the website. The analysis was conducted by two coders. A master-coder reliability test revealed satisfactory results with Krippendorff's alpha averaging .90. We thereby classified each actor according to the political position advocated, the geographical area he/she is most active in (e.g. Germany, UK, US, global) and the actor type he/she belongs to (e.g. political actors, media, civil society, bloggers). In the coding instructions we clearly indicated that an actor's self-categorization determines its classification. To identify the political position of the media we coded at minimum three editorials dealing with climate change. If all sampled editorials show a clear-cut position pointing in the same direction, this position was attributed to the actor; otherwise a no-position category was attributed. Analyses describing the coalitions as such (H i * index, vitality and composition scores) are based on actors with a political position only (Germany: 335; UK: 312).
Coalitions' identification, resources and their origin
Following the idea of Sabatier (1988) the primary feature of a coalition is its belief system based on shared core (policy) ideas and values. To identify the core ideological dimension of coalitions we rely on content analysis data, i.e. the coding of an actor's political position. As a result, we classify actors as climate advocates, climate skeptics or no-position actors. Although the ideological core beliefs are central to demarcate coalitions, Sabatier (1988) assumes that coalition members also show some form of coordination. We use hyperlinks to study such coordination. Coordination is indicated if more links run among like-minded actors than to those having other political positions (see also Elgin, 2015; Fisher et al., 2013) .
We can expect this requirement to be met due to the principle of homophily in linking behaviour and as otherwise the linking economy of the web would play against the own camp. To measure how strongly links refer to allies and how strongly to opponents, we rely on the homophily index H i * (Ackland, 2013; Currarini et al., 2009 ). This index relates the links within a group to those from the group to others and adjusts for the group size. The index has the advantage that it is not dependent on the number of actors in the two opposing camps, and that it is standardized between -1 and +1. A value lower than 0 means that the actors of a camp predominantly interact with opponents (heterophily, Monge & Contractor, 2003) , while values greater than 0 mean that they primarily relate to those of their own group (homophily).
Finally, we can only speak of coalitions if they show some stability in the course of time. To measure stability of coalitions we analyze how often a coalition member shows up in the net-work in our eleven-month period. This so-called vitality score of each actor thus varies between 1 and 11 with the latter indicating that an actor is always present in the network. As there is no clear standard against which we can judge whether we find 'enough' stability to speak of coalitions, we regard it as sufficient if we find a core of allies in each coalition that is present through all of the points in time.
To measure coalitions' resources, we study the composition of coalitions as well as at their online visibility. Regarding composition, we rely on content analysis data indicating the degree to which political actors as well as (traditional) media are members of coalitions and how strongly they are rooted in the national arena. For the online visibility, we look at the degree distribution, i.e. indegree (Burt, 1976) and eigenvector distributions (Bonacich, 1972) .
The indegree measure simply counts the number of links an actor receives whereas the eigenvector centrality evaluates those links as more important that stem from actors with high online visibility themselves. To evaluate the online visibility, we first compare the average recognition of coalition members of climate advocates and skeptics. As average scores might be misleading due to variation in coalition size, we analyze in a second step, which coalition manages to have the most visible actors within our networks.
To identify the origins of visibility, we combine an analysis of the direction of link setting (i.e. towards the own or opponent camp) with the absolute amount of link setting activity of an actor (i.e. actors differing in their quantity of link setting).
Results
Identification of coalitions
The data clearly support the idea that online contestation is structured by coalitions. First, more than 88% of all network actors in the British network and more than 92% in the German network formulate a clear-cut political position which supports the relevance of belief systems. Not surprisingly in light of the existing policy monopolies in both countries, the number of climate advocates is more than double as high as that of climate skeptics (UK: 218 advocates versus 94 skeptics; Germany: 242 advocates versus 93 skeptics, see for a visualization Figure 1 & 2 in the Appendix).
Analyzing the interaction patterns of climate advocates and skeptics shows that links running among like-minded actors outnumber cross-camp linking, which suggests some form of internal coordination. This tendency towards homophily can be expressed by the index H (Currarini et al., 2009), developed further by Ackland (2013, p. 100) to take into account the different size of the single groups. The corrected homophily index H* is thus defined as
Here, s i are the ties internal to the group and d i those connecting the group to others, while v i is the size of the group and w i the size the rest of the population. Values greater than zero indicate homophily, values lower than zero heterophily. We can see from Table 1 that the camps in both networks show a substantial degree of homophily. However, these values are indicative of a coalition only to the extent that they differ significantly from what would be expected by chance, and we therefore compared the observed linking patterns for the two camps in both of the networks with 1'000 random configurations for each of them. The simulations were based on the actual networks in terms of the number of nodes and the number of edges, which were distributed at random between the actors. For the UK and Germany, we simulated the networks at each single point in time, stacked them, and then calculated the H i * index for climate advocates and skeptics. The result is a distribution of H i * index scores for both countries and we then compared the empirical values to the means of the simulations, finding that in each case the distances between them were greater than 20 standard deviations. The introspective orientation of the actors in the camps can therefore be taken as a significant marker of a coalition building process.
[ Table 1 ]
Finally, the last criterion stipulates that the camps display a certain amount of stability. While all the camps are characterized by a substantial amount of fluctuation, Table 2 shows that stability does not decrease linearly, but rather describes an u-shaped curve that reveals a stable core. We again used a simulation procedure to assess whether the stability dynamic we see at work differs significantly from what would be expected by chance. We generated an n by m matrix for each camp where the number of columns m equals the replications of the simulation, 10 5 in each case, whereas the number of rows n equals the number of nodes in the camp.
Each node can take on a random value between one (lowest vitality) and eleven (highest vitality), but the sums of the rows in each column must be equal to the sum of the observed vitality values for each camp. We then summed the scores for each vitality value in the matrices and compared the resulting distributions to the observed scores using a permutation test with a chi-square statistic implemented in the wPerm package for R (Weiss, 2015) . The results show that in each case the observed amount of stable allies in each coalition is significantly higher than in the simulations, which supports the notion of at least stable coalition cores. Note that due our filter criterion for the network (total degree of two, minimum of one indegree requirement for each node) the source seeds need not be present at all points in time, particularly if they lack an inlink.
[Table2]
Coalitions' resources and their origins
To evaluate the online resources of the two coalitions, we first look at their composition (see Express), but also to conservative online-only newspapers and magazines (e.g. Canadian Free
Press, American Thinker, Daily Caller). The mainstream coalition of climate advocates, in contrast, is more strongly nationally grounded and composed of traditional civil society actors (whose share amounts to 51% among the UK advocates and 48% among the German advocates), mass media (29% in the UK, 25% in Germany) and to a lesser degree political actors (9% in the UK, 15% in Germany) which indicates stronger connections to traditional venues (and also to a broader setting of mainstream media reaching beyond the conservative sphere). Consequently, the mainstream coalition is more resourceful as regards allies.
[ Table 3a and Table 3b ]
Comparing the average visibility of coalition members reveals that climate skeptics receive around twice as many inlinks as climate advocates. The average climate skeptic in the UK network receives 30 links within the stacked network whereas the average climate advocate has only 15 -a difference that proves to be statistically significant (permutation test v , p-value = 0.001). Although the total amount of links within the German network is lower, the relationship remains similar: whereas climate skeptics have an average of 15 links, climate advocates' amounts to 9 (permutation test, p-value = 0.014). Interestingly, these findings can be replicated if the comparison is based on eigenvector centrality which indicates that climate skeptics on average do not only receive more links but also receive more links from important actors (permutation test Germany, p-value < 0.0001; permutation test UK, p-value < 0.0001). These results are particularly relevant, since the size of the climate skeptic coalition in both countries is only ca. 40% of that of climate advocates and they would therefore be expected to have a lower average indegree.
In a second step, we analyze which coalition manages to have the most visible actors within our networks. The analysis clearly shows that our networks fit the typical uneven distribution of recognition: among the 353 (361) actors in the UK (German) network, it is 29 (30) who receive 50% of the links. Among them climate skeptics are strong. Among the 29 most visible actors with the UK network, we have 15 skeptics, 12 advocates and 2 no-position actors.
Among the most prominent actors in the German network, we have 15 skeptics, 14 advocates and 1 no-position actor.
The strength of climate skeptics becomes even more evident, if we look at the single most important actors which by the way also constitute the stable core of each coalition. In the UK, Turning finally to the origins of climate skeptics' online visibility, Table 4 shows the average link setting activity of coalition members and how it is directed towards the own or the opponent coalition. It indicates that in both countries climate skeptic allies have the highest link setting activity. Skeptics in the UK (Germany) set on average 42 (20) links compared to 9 (7) links stemming from an average advocate. As shown before each coalition privileges likeminded actors with its linking behavior. The high activity of climate skeptics pushes thus skeptics into the pole position of online communication (although their tendency to link to like-minded actors is weaker compared to the advocates). Climate skeptics thus turn out to be the true winners of online communication: they actively exploit the link economy of the web and as a consequence get into the pole position there. While both camps display a tendency towards preferential attachment (Barabási & Albert, 1999 , see for empirical evidence Figure   3 in the Appendix), i.e. they have large proportions of low-degree nodes, which tend to build ties to established ones, thus contributing to the "rich getting richer" phenomenon, there are also important differences to note. Skeptics, more than advocates, profit from the higher share of mid-degree nodes and particularly from the engagement of bloggers. Bloggers are predominantly active on the skeptical side of the debate and contribute to creating "crowdsourced elites" (Jackson and Foucault Welles 2015), that is, actors that command no substantial social or political status outside these digital spaces, but nevertheless occupy a central position in them.
[ Table 4 ]
Discussion
Political contestation in times where mainstreamers hold a policy monopoly and countervoices are weak in traditional venues, has four characteristics in the online world. First, such online contestation is structured by coalitions. Such coalitions are characterized by common beliefs, coordination via hyperlinks vi , i.e. preferential linking patterns to allies, and a core of stable coalition members. Second, our study shows that composition-wise the mainstream coalitions are more resourceful also on the Web as they are better connected to traditional venues. However, the counter-coalitions constituted primarily by Internet-based voices have already established strong ties to one traditional venue, the conservative media landscape of which at least a part has been shown to also push the climate skeptical views in their traditional media outlets (Author However, also this study has limitations. First, with its sole focus on hyperlinks as fabric of the web, it neglects connections on the web that are shaped by a multitude of web users via participatory features of social media platforms (Gerlitz & Helmond, 2013 Weiss NA (2015) (11) 8 (9) 1.2e6 (12) 12 (6) 3.0e6 (14) 7 (7) 1.0e6 (11) 5 15 (6) 1.9e6 (8) 1 (1) 6.4e5 (7) 4 (2) 2.0e6 (9) 2 (2) 7.8e5 (8) 6 12 (5) 2.0e6 (8) 0 (0) 7.0e5 (7) 4 (2) 2.6e6 (12) 6 (6) 6.6e5 (7) 7 13 (5) 8.1e5 (3) 1 (1) 5.6e5 (6) 9 (4) 1.7e6 (8) 4 (4) 1.0e6 (11) 8 5 (2) 5.2e5 (2) 4 (4) 3.6e5 (4) 7 (3) 1.4e6 (6) 3 (3) 1.1e6 (12) 9 9 (4) 3.7e5 (2) 1 (1) 2.3e5 (3) 12 (6) 1.3e6 (6) 7 (7) 6.7e5 (7) 10 9 (4) 2.9e5 (1) 4 (4) 1.8e5 (2) 17 (8) 1.1e6 (5) 8 (9) 5.8e5 (6) 11 3 (1) 1.0e5 (0) 
